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Consumer-Facing Technology Fraud: Economics, Attack Methods
and Potential SolutionsI
Mohammed Aamir Ali∗, Mario Parreno Centeno, Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Feng Hao, Aad
van Moorsel
School of Computing, Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom
Abstract
The emerging use of modern technologies has not only benefited society but also attracted
fraudsters and criminals to misuse the technology for financial benefits. Fraud over the Inter-
net still increases dramatically, resulting in an annual loss of billions of dollars to subscribers,
service providers and regulators worldwide. Much of such fraud directly impact individuals,
both in the case of browser-based and mobile Internet based services, as well as when using
traditional telephony services, either through landline phones or mobiles. It is important
that users of the technology should be both informed about fraud, as well as protected
from frauds through fraud detection and prevention systems. In this paper, we present an
anatomy of frauds for different consumer-facing technologies from three broad perspectives
- we discuss Internet, mobile and traditional telecommunication, from the perspectives of
losses through frauds over the technology, fraud attack mechanisms and systems used for
detecting and preventing frauds.The paper also provides recommendations for securing the
emerging technologies from fraud and attacks.
Keywords: Consumer Frauds, Card Payment Frauds, Mobile Payment Frauds,
Telecommunications Fraud, Fraud Economics, Fraud Mechanism
1. Introduction
The Internet today has reached a stage where many aspects of our lives are connected
online, which includes buying products and services, doing businesses, banking, booking,
managing of traveling and vacations and more. The advances in Internet technology have
also greatly empowered criminals to misuse the Internet technologies for financial frauds
[1]. The Internet has made it possible for cybercriminals to commit crimes at a distance
of thousands of miles away, in another jurisdiction, hiding their identities and beyond the
reach of any prosecutor. Cyber frauds result in a loss of around $608 billion to consumers,
enterprises, and governments across the world [2].
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Table 1: Regional distribution of cybercrime for the year 2017 [2].
Region (World Bank) Region GDP
(USD, tril-
lions)
Cybercrime
Cost (USD,
billions)
Cybercrime
Loss (%GDP)
North America 20.2 140 to 175 0.69 to 0.87%
Europe and Central Asia 20.3 160 to 180 0.79 to 0.89%
East Asia & the Pacific 22.5 120 to 200 0.53 to 0.89%
South Asia 2.9 7 to 15 0.24 to 0.52%
Latin America & the
Caribbean
5.3 15 to 30 0.28 to 0.57%
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 1 to 3 0.07 to 0.20%
MENA 3.1 2 to 5 0.06 to 0.16%
World $75.8 $445 to $608 0.59 to 0.80%
Table 1 shows the regional distribution of cybercrime measured for the year 2017. In
recent years, the cost of global cybercrime has increased from $445 billion in 2014 to $608
billion in 2017 [2]. Table 1 also compares regional GDP with the percentage loss in GDP as a
result of cybercrime. It can be derived from the table that the higher the regional GDP, the
greater are the losses associated with the cybercrime. The cybercriminals can use a number
of ways to defraud the user of the technology. They can use stolen personal information ones
debit, credit or store card, they can acquire such information over via social engineering and
phishing attack using telephone and web(email, social networks). A recent report published
by Symantec revealed that 978 million people in 20 countries were affected by cybercrime
in 2017 [3]. These frauds resulted in a loss of $172 billion (an average of $142 per victim) to
the consumers. Furthermore, the report also revealed that consumers spend nearly 24 hours
on average dealing with the aftermath. Additionally, these frauds not only bring financial
loss but also leave the psychological and social effects on the well being of the victims [4] .
Some of the most common cybercrimes experienced by consumers today include debit
or credit card fraud, hacking of an email or social media account, electronic commerce
frauds and disclosing private information to fraudsters via the telephone call or clicking on
phishing email [3]. Specifically, in the United Kingdom, it is estimated that the UK economy
is suffering from the loss of around 27 billion per annum due to these cyber frauds [5]. UK
businesses are affected the most at a cost of around £21 billion, followed by the government
and citizens, with a damage of around £3 billion each. The Internet Crime Complaint Center
has received around 11000 complaints in 2017, resulting in a loss of around $15 million, 90%
higher than the losses reported in 2016 [6]. Furthermore, Microsoft also saw a subnational
increase in the tech scam i.e. a 24% increase in tech scams reported by customers in 2017
over the previous year [7] with the average loss of $200 to $400 each. Fraud over financial
systems such as ransomware, card payment, and Crime as a Service (CaaS) is found to be
some of the established and professionalized ways of the fraud [8].
In most cases, cybercriminals make use of customer facing platforms to target victims and
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practice cyber frauds. Some of the highly targeted customer-facing platforms include but
are not limited to payment systems, where cybercriminals take control of the target victim’s
payment account; attacks on mobile platforms where a victim’s mobile phone is targeted
to get control over payment applications; and least studied telecommunication fraud where
illegitimate acts are performed by targeting a victim through their telephony network. With
the evolution in cyber systems, cybercriminals have also evolved in their methods of targeting
cybersystems and there is a strong need to characterize the most used mechanism of cyber
crimes in order to protect organizations and consumers from cybercriminals.
In this paper, we discuss cybercrimes in three dimensions: 1) economics of cybercrime --
what is the cost of frauds and how much is required to have a defense, 2) attack mechanisms
-- what attack mechanism criminals are using to fraud consumers and enterprises, and
3) prevention and detection systems -- what technical systems and techniques used by
service providers to protect their consumers. We provided economics of cyber crimes based
on reports published by government agencies and popular security companies. We analyzed
the fraud mechanism in three diverse technologies: 1) card payment technologies and frauds,
2) mobile payment frauds and 3) telecommunication frauds. We choose these technologies
for the following reasons: 1) the user base on these technologies are very high (e.g. there are
around more than 5 billion telephone users), 2) collective frauds over these technologies are
more than $60 billion [9, 10], 3) telephony become the preferred media to target the use for
payment and card frauds. . We believe that this is the first study that covers various aspects
of frauds on diverse technologies. Where applicable, the paper provides recommendations to
improve the security of the system and safeguard individuals from the cybercriminals. This
study would help consumers, regulators, service provider, and law enforcement agencies to
know about the how fraudsters are misusing the technologies and common defenses used to
protect the consumers.
In summary, the major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• It provides a comprehensive discussion on the systems used by enterprises to safeguard
their clients from frauds.
• It highlights recommendations for the effective cyber defense.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3 discusses credit card payment technologies,
frauds over each methods of card payments, attack mechanism and possible defenses. Section
4 presents discussion on frauds in mobile payment systems. Section 5 presents discussion on
the frauds in the telecommunication systems. Section 6 discusses ways forward and future
directions to secure consumers from frauds. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Frauds Over Internet Technologies
The cybercriminal use the Internet technology for the fraud activities in two ways: 1)
spreading malicious content e.g malware, Trojans or viruses that in turn leak private infor-
mation of the victims [11], and 2) convincing victims to disclose their private information
via social engineering attack. Internet based applications have created new opportunities
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for businesses and retailers but at the same time it has paved new ways for fraudsters to use
the new mechanism to commit fraud with users and businesses. Every year, a large number
of people loss their money to different type of frauds over the Internet applications such
as ecommerce, online dating, online gaming, credit card frauds, telephone frauds, mobile
payment frauds etc. The commerce frauds can be of different types that includes, merchant
delivered the product, which is quite different from the product listed at the time purchase,
did not sent product or sent product of low quality. Some of the most common frauds hap-
pening today over the online marketplaces are: buyers not receiving goods that they have
ordered, receiving products that have inferior value or are significantly different from the
original description [12]. The statistics by Experian revealed that e-commerce frauds (online
auctions, buying products) have increased by 33% since 2015 [13]. Frauds over the online
marketplaces have resulted in an annual loss that cost users billions of dollars all over the
world [14, 15].
Over the Internet, the fraudsters have created a large number of fake pages for two
purposes: 1) they convince end-user to click on some link through social engineering or
phishing attack or silently download the malicious software on the user computer whenever
the user visited the malicious web page. These fraudsters also convince users to call the
special expensive telephone number, which not only result in loss of finance because of
calling to the premium number but also result in disclosing their financial information to
fraudsters. Another type of fraud that is popular over the internet is the Advanced Fee
Fraud (AFF). This fraud is committed by asking victims to pay some amount to process
their incentive, which can be in the form of leftover money of deceased Nigerian rich person,
an offer of job with relatively high pay, and the luck person selected for the holiday vacations.
The common attribute of these frauds is that victim must pay a small amount of money to
get the huge amount from the attack.
3. Card Payment Frauds
This section will provide an overview of card payment technologies and payment fraud
as it affects the global payment system. We will start with a brief introduction to the
payment system types. Section 3.1 discusses card payments fraud landscape and details
current fraud trends. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 presents an introduction to the technology
and security features of each card payment type and will then detail tools any techniques
used by cybercriminals to abuse the card payment system.
Typically, a card payment system can be categorized into card present and card not
present (CNP). In card present payment system, the cardholder is physically present at the
merchant store and a payment is performed by swiping (magnetic stripe), inserting (chip
and PIN) or tapping (in case of contactless) a payment card to the merchant provided point
of sale (PoS) terminal/reader. With card present transactions the identity of the cardholder
making a transaction is established either by requesting a card’s PIN, or by the cardholder
signature. There are more security elements when combined enhances the security of card
present transactions, for example, the security features of smart cards with chip enables
it to host payment related information securely. Card present payment security is further
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advanced with the use of cryptographic techniques that binds each transaction with a unique
transaction specific code or cryptogram. Within card present payment technologies we have:
• Magnetic stripe cards
• EMV chip & PIN cards, with three protocol variants: Static Data Authentication
(SDA), Dynamic (DDA) and Combined (CDA)
• EMV contactless cards, with three protocol variants (SDA, fast DDA and fast CDA)
With Card Not Present (CNP) payment system, on the other hand, the cardholder
enters her payment card details on the checkout page provided by the merchant website.
The security of CNP payment system relies upon the cardholder correctly providing her
payment card details which may be shared with ‘every’ merchant that the cardholder makes
a transaction with. CNP payment system has two grievous security limitations. Firstly, the
identity of the actual cardholder cannot be established by the merchant or by the card issuer
and secondly the card details are static which remains same until the card service is expired.
To overcome these limitations, the payment industry came with a user-authentication scheme
which requires the cardholder to establish their identity with the card issuer before the
transaction is approved.
We will expand more on the working and technology limitations of each type of card
payment system in section 2.1 to 2.5 but before let us discuss the fraud landscape over card
payments.
3.1. Economics of Card Payments Frauds
Payment card fraud is an international issue that spans across nations, states and borders.
Fraud overpayment cards has amounted to a total of $22.80 billion globally for the year 2016
[16]. This is 4.4% increase in the global card payment fraud rate as compared to the year
2015 where it was recorded $21.79 billion [16]. The United States (US) alone accounts for
an overall of two-fifths (38.7%) of the global card payment fraud rate amounting to a total
of $8.45bn for the year 2016 and it is estimated that by the year 2020 the US card payment
fraud could surpass $28bn [17]. To the contrary, card fraud losses for Europe in 2016 reached
$2.12bn and about 73% of the European card fraud came from the United Kingdom (UK)
and France [18]. In fact for Europe, card payment fraud in one of the EMPACT priority,
under Europols priority crime areas (2018-2021 EU Policy Cycle [19]). Over the last six years
it is established that the costs associated with the losses on financial systems constituted to
the largest single category of fraud across the globe and over the Internet [18].
So how does a perpetrator achieves in practicing fraud over electronic payment systems?
A simple answer to this question is fraudsters in most cases targets weakness in the pay-
ment system technologies and exploits them for their interests and/or monetary gain. The
methods used by fraudsters to abuse the payment system varies and depends upon the type
of system (among card present and CNP) being targeted. Fraudsters methods can be well
understood by mapping the payment card fraud patterns over the evolution/improvements
of card payment technologies. For this study, we take the payment card fraud patterns from
the UK.
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Figure 1: UK Card Fraud by Type from year 1998 to 2018.
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Figure 1 shows UK card fraud statistics1 from 1998 to 2016 [20]. The statistics reveal
that ratio between the different types of card fraud changes year on year. In the figure, the
yellow line represents fraud losses on card present payment types and green line signifies the
fraud that occurred over CNP payment interface. Figure 1 also shows the introduction for
significant security improvements in the card payment system technology listed below
1. smartcards with EMV2 Chip and Pin protocol: were introduced in the year 2004
replacing earlier magnetic stripe cards for card present transactions
2. transaction risk profiling: card issuing banks started to use transaction risk profiling
algorithms that assessed the risks associated with transactions
3. more secure EMV protocol: the EMV protocol introduced a more secure form of trans-
action data authentication mitigating security flaws associated with earlier versions of
EMV protocol implementations
Prior to 2004, before the introduction of EMV chip and pin, fraudsters have shown to
target the magnetic stripe based card present transactions. CNP fraud, on the other hand,
shows a gradual increase from the year 1997 to 2008 just before transaction risk profiling
was introduced. However, fraudsters have shown to bypass CNP transaction safeguards as
this is reflected by the growing fraud rates (from year 2011) of CNP payment systems. CNP
fraud standouts to be the single largest category of fraud amounting to a total of 70% of
the total card fraud rate for the year 2016 [20].
Now that we understand the types and areas of fraud over card payment systems let
us take a look at technology behind each card payment system, security limitations of card
payment systems and attacker methods while abusing the target payment system.
3.2. Magnetic Stripe Cards - Technology, Attacker Methods and Solutions
Magnetic stripe cards have a capability to store information which can be read electron-
ically by magnetic stripe reader head. Each magnetic stripe payment card comes with a
pre-loaded payment application that contains information about the user payment account
as embedded by the card issuing bank. There are two tracks containing payment data lo-
cated within the magnetic stripe Track 1 and Track 2. Track 1 includes all fields of Track 2
plus the cardholders name and additional fields for exclusive use by the card issuer. Mainly
we have a field for 16-digit Primary Account Number (PAN) 3, cardholder name, cards
expiry date, a service code which specifies the interchange rules and controls risk manage-
ment functions and the final field is discretionary data which is used to provide security
functions to a magnetic stripe transaction. Discretionary data includes one or more of the
following fields: PIN Verification Key Indicator (PKVI) [22] , PIN Verification Value (PVV)
[22], Card Verification Value (CVV) [23] and Card Validation Code (CVC) [23]. With each
1The fraud statistics from UK was one of the early adopter of secure payment technologies
2EMVCo [21] is a consortium of card payment networks (VisaCo, MasterCard, American Express, JCB
and Discover) that was set-up to maintain interoperability between payment card operation.
3A 16-digit card number which is also printed on the front of the card. PAN uniquely identifies the
cardholder account with the card issuer
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Figure 2: Showing a magnetic stripe skimming device found attached on an ATM machine [24]. The internal
circuitry of the skimming device is also shown.
magnetic stripe read, the card provides stored payment application data which is fetched by
the PoS terminal to process a transaction. The terminal then applies security protocols for
cardholder verification and risk management to complete a transaction.
Each magnetic stripe card has a cryptographically derived Card Verification Value (CVV)
which makes magnetic stripe cards much secure than just having the PAN and expiry date
[23]. CVV prevents counterfeit cards from being generated using the cardholder data ob-
tained from paper receipts. CVV is a three-digit value generated by the card issuing banks
and is embedded in card data before the card is issued to the cardholder. During a transac-
tion, if there is a match in CVV received during the payment request to that of the locally
generated CVV by the card issuer, the transaction data is marked to be authentic which is
coming from the real-card issued to the cardholder.
However, magnetic stripe cards work simply as memory sticks and are best suited for
the applications like ticketing, loyalty pass where security is not of prime importance. Apart
from storing and retrieval of static data, not many operations could be performed on the
magnetic stripe cards. The other problem associated with the magnetic stripe card is the
amount of information that can be read. The access control policies on fetching the amount
of data could not be defined on the magnetic stripe. This means any reader with magnetic
head can read all the contents stored within a magnetic stripe. This came as an opportunity
for attackers to practice a trivial type of fraud on the magnetic stripe cards: Skimming and
Cloning.
3.2.1. Magnetic Stripe Cards - Skimming and Card Cloning
In skimming fraud, the magnetic stripe technology cannot prove the difference in the
actuality of a real and counterfeit card generated through skimming. In this type of fraud,
ATMs are physically modified with a minimal effort in a manner that is difficult for the
cardholder to detect. The way skimming works is that thieves put a card scanner on top
of the little slot where the payment card is typically inserted in an ATM machine. These
skimmers allow the card to pass through them into the ATM slot while also scanning the
card and stealing the numbers off it. This happens so discretely that many victims have no
idea that something is amiss until they look at their bank statements probably weeks later.
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And because many ATM card slots use similar designs, there are plenty of skimmers that
are designed to look almost exactly similar to legitimate card slots making it even harder for
a customer to realize what is going on. Of course, though, the magnetic stripe transactions
are protected with a PIN, and to do anything notoriously useful with the skimmed card. To
steal the PIN, miscreants also install small pinhole cameras in inconspicuous locations on
the ATM to capture footage of cardholder keying the PIN. To capture PIN, there are also
number pad overlayers available on the black market which just look like the keypad on the
ATM. Nowadays due to this becoming common practice, the public and banks have become
more aware and the scammer may get caught when they try to retrieve their scamming
equipment from the ATMs. To resolve this, more advanced skimming devices on the black
market transmit stolen card information and PINs wirelessly making it much easier for
the fraudsters to practice their scheme without getting caught. To overcome the magnetic
stripe cards skimming and cloning attacks, the payment card industry introduced more
secure forms of card payment which came in the form of EMV chip and PIN cards described
next.
3.3. EMV Chip and PIN Cards - Technology, Attacker Methods and Solutions
EMVCo created the “Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems”[25].
These specifications define an EMV chip and pin protocol [25], a messaging standard using
which the payment cards operate and communicate with compatible readers. EMV draws
is key functionality using features provided by the smart cards and supports either of the
following three payment operations:
Static Data Authentication. SDA was only designed for initial versions of smart
cards that had limited processing capability and can securely store only limited data. SDA
validates the integrity of the application data stored within the smart card IC. However,
SDA does not authenticate the card itself. During the card personalization phase (before
the card is issued to the cardholder), the card issuer prepares the payment Application Data
(AD) which is relevant to the cardholder account. The AD is signed with the card issuers
private key (S1) and is stored in the smart card IC. The card issuer public key (P1) is signed
by the Certificate Authoritys (CA’s) private key (SCA) and this issuer public key certificate
is stored in the smart card’s memory. During the transaction process, when the cardholder
inserts the card into the PoS terminal, the CA’s public key (PCA) (which is issued to the
acquirer and resides with the PoS terminal) is used to decrypt the issuer public key certificate
which resides within the card. The PoS terminal extracts the issuer public key (P1) from
the certificate. In the next step, the PoS extracts the signed application data (signed by S1)
from the card and validates it using P1. Once the signed application data is found valid,
the reader and the issuer can be assured that the data in the smart card memory can be
trusted and has not been altered.
Dynamic Data Authentication. DDA is an advance scheme of card authentication,
where each card is personalized with its private key used by the card to generate a signature
Signed DDA (SDDA). The signature encodes transaction data and a random number given
to the card by the PoS terminal which guarantees uniqueness for every transaction. In this
scheme of card authentication, the cards public key (PIC) is signed by the issuers private key
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(S1), and the card public key certificate is stored in the smart card IC. The issuer public key
(P1) is further signed by CA’s private key (SCA), and issuer public key certificate is stored
in the smart card IC. The CA’s public keys are distributed to the PoS terminals. During
the transaction, the validation of SDDA by the reader indicates that the card is authentic
and is issued to the cardholder by the card issuer.
Combined Data Authentication. With CDA, both the POS terminal and the card
issuer verify the integrity of the payment card. Much similar to DDA, in CDA the card
generates a transaction specific signature (SDDA) which is used by the PoS to verify the
transaction. In addition, an Application Cryptogram (AC) is also generated by the issuing
bank to be signed by the card using a shared secret key. An AC consist of transaction specific
data and a random number which guarantees transaction uniqueness. During a transaction,
a request to sign the AC is sent to the card by the card issuing bank. Having validated the
received signed AC from the card, the issuing bank can guarantee the card authentication.
The above three EMV methods guarantee that the payment card is authentic and the
data inside the card is unaltered by any adversary activity. The security of EMV enabled
transaction is further enhanced with the use of card’s PIN only known to a valid cardholder.
This guarantees that only the authorized person entitled by the card issuing bank is using
the card. These security features make EMV the most suitable payment protocol for card
payments. On the flip side, EMV payment cards also exhibit certain limitations which
affect the security of other forms of the payment system. Below we will discuss limitations
or attacks that were explored on the EMV chip and pin payment cards.
3.3.1. EMV Chip and Pin Shimming
As discussed in the previous section, EMV defines functions that establish the authentic-
ity of the card, however, there is no mechanism defined which verifies the authenticity of the
reader that the card communicates with. This provides ample opportunity for an attacker
with a rogue reader to communicate with the EMV card. Figure 3 shows two EMV shim-
mer devices found in EMV enabled ATM machines. These shimmers are attacker tools that
intercept communication between the EMV card and a PoS terminal or an ATM. Although
there is no known possibility for an attacker can create a cloned copy of victim’s EMV card,
instead the, shimmed details are used to create a magnetic stripe version of victim’s card.
EMV smart card chip contains all components of cardholder payment application data
found in magnetic stripe except for CVV. EMV interface contains its own version of Card
Verification Value generally referred to as iCVV or dynamic CVV. iCVV which is different to
magnetic stripe CVV prevents the shimmed data being copied and used over magnetic stripe
interface. The rationality behind the success of shimming can be related to the negligence
of some card issuing banks while validating the CVV. Shimming works because some card
issuing banks do not validate the CVV while authorizing a magnetic stripe transaction [26].
3.3.2. EMV Chip and PIN Protocol Flaws
EMV Chip and Pin is an open-source and well-documented protocol. The proven com-
plexity of EMV Chip and Pin protocol and its widespread use across the globe made the
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Figure 3: Shows two EMV shimmer devices found in EMV enabled ATM machines. On the left, it is a
shimmer device found in Canada and rigth side one was discovered in an ATM machine in Europe. Figures
of shimmer devices are taken from [26].
protocol much attractive for research communities. There is a substantial amount of re-
search addressing the security analysis of EMV Chip and Pin protocol. We will focus on a
research which has identified a practical exploitable vulnerability in the EMV protocol.
Murdoch et al. (2010) [27] identified a flaw in the EMV chip and pin protocol which allows
an attacker to authorize a payment while entering an incorrect PIN. Researchers introduced
a man-in-the-middle device which can subvert the cardholder verification process by telling
the POS terminal that the PIN entered by the attacker is correct, whilst telling the EMV
card that this is a transaction verified by signature and therefore no PIN is required. This
bypass the primary security of the EMV Chip & PIN protocol, i.e. the cardholder PIN. The
research team performed practical experiments to demonstrate that the vulnerability was
present in the UK issued credit/debit cards and UK POS terminals. The importance of this
research was highlighted in the year 2012 when fraudsters were arrested in France. It was
discovered that the fraudsters had exploited this vulnerability to conduct 6,000 fraudulent
purchases with a total value of more than 500,000 [28].
3.4. EMV Contactless: Technology, Attacker Methods and Solutions
The advancements in the EMV payment ecosystem towards fast and secure payments
were achieved with the introduction of contactless cards. Unlike chip and PIN card which
require a point of contact for communication with the reader, contactless card talks to POS
terminal wirelessly using RFID technology. Contactless payments are designed for low-cost
in-store payments usually about £30 in the UK and do not require PIN verification for
cardholder authentication.
The EMV contactless transaction protocol [29] derived from the EMV chip and pin
protocol and is further enhanced to minimize the transaction processing times at the PoS
terminal. The EMV contactless specifications define at least two variations of contactless
transaction protocol. Both of these protocol sequences derive three security features from
EMV chip and pin protocol as defined in Section 3.3. Although proven to provide conve-
nience to the customer and speed to the low-value payments, the contactless interface of
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EMV payment cards has introduced a new series of attack vectors on card payments which
are discussed below:
3.4.1. EMV Contactless Protocol Flaws
Emms et al. (2013) [30] exploited the EMV offline Pin verify command from contact-
less interface. Contactless transactions do not require the cardholder to enter their PIN.
However, the researchers discovered the offline PIN verify command is functionally available
on most of the UK issued payment cards. This PIN verify command can be exploited by
an attacker to guess the card PIN without blocking the card. The research demonstrated
a viable attack scenario where a contactless physical access control reader is programmed
with part of an EMV transaction protocol. When the user scans a wallet with payment card
onto the access control reader, it selects a payment application on the card.
In another study, Emms et al. (2014) [31] exploited a currency limit handling command in
the EMV contactless specifications. Typically, for UK based payments cards the maximum
threshold for a transaction value is £30. However, the researchers demonstrated that for
contactless cards, when a transaction is made in a currency type foreign to the card issued
country, the card will allow transactions of unlimited value. It was shown by their research
that the UK issued contactless card accepted a transaction of 1 million euros without the
PIN.
3.5. CNP Payments - Technology, Limitations and Attacker Methods
The ease and convenience with which a customer can make purchases over the Internet
benefited both the customer and the merchants alike. Within CNP payment system we have
authorization-only and user-authentication enabled CNP payment protocols. Authorization-
only CNP protocols provided more convenience to the shopping process where customers
were only required to fill and submit their payment card details which includes 16 digit card
number, card’s expiry date, three digit card security code (CVV2) and cardholder address
information to the Internet-based merchants. For fraudsters, however, this convenience came
as an opportunity to steal customer’s card details and misuse them for later use.
The first attempt to combat growing CNP payment fraud came in the year 2001 where
payment networks (Visa, MasterCard, American Express et al.) introduced 3 Domain Secure
(3DS) protocol. It introduced the concept of user-authentication for payment transactions
over the Internet. For every CNP payment transaction, 3DS required the customers provide
a passwords, thus combating the growing CNP payment fraud. However, the 3DS protocol
exhibited two design flaws: activation during shopping and the use of static passwords.
Activation during shopping required the cardholders to register with 3DS during the time
of purchase. This enabled even attackers with stolen card details to register victim’s card
over the 3DS. Additionally, attackers were still able to trick victims to give away their static
3DS password. Because of these reasons most merchants still stay hesitant to adopt the 3DS
and prefer using authorization-only CNP payment protocol. This freedom of choice for the
merchants (i.e. the use of user-authentication and/or authorization-only), in the ways to
accept online payments even left pathways for the attacker to exploit loopholes and practice
fraud over CNP payment system.
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Table 2: Card number information fields (Numbering is from left to right)
Card number: 4658 - 5900 - 0000 - 000C
First six digits: called as Bank Identification Number (BIN), iden-
tifies the card brand and issuing bank
Digits 7 to (15): assigned by the card issuing bank and denotes
personal account number shown as zeros´
Last digit: akin to checksum (indicated by ‘C’), used by a computer
to verify the card number entered is correct
The most common techniques employed by fraudsters to abuse the CNP payment includes
phishing and targeting victim’s machines with specially crafted malwares which are designed
to steal payment card details. Stolen card details are either used by adversaries or are
traded on online portals. Trading of credit card numbers in the underground market has
previously been studied in the academic literature [12]. Even today the trading of credit
card details are real as we provide a list of at least 15 live illicit websites/forums [See Table
A.4 in Appendix A] where card details are still traded. Since phishing [32][33], card details
stealing malwares[34][35][36] and trading of card details in underground forums [37][38] has
been comprehensively studied, for brevity we did not expand these attacker techniques in
this paper. In the following sections we detail three limitations that we explored within the
CNP payment system:
• Card Skimming (Magstripe, EMV Chip and PIN and EMV Contactless)
• Merchant Receipts and Guessable Card Numbers
• Architecture of Authorization Response Codes
3.5.1. Card skimming
Also as discussed in section 3.3.2 the design of card present payment protocols [25][39][40]
mandates the card number to be stored as plain text within the cards memory; this enables
even an illegitimate card reader to communicate and interpret the card details. Such an
unusual design for a payment protocols offers at least two opportunities for an attacker to
obtain payment card details. Firstly, it is well-known for a contactless card that card number
and expiry date could be skimmed from a distance with any NFC enabled device [24][41]
and in fact, in a single google play search, we located 38 freely available Android apps which
could be used by an attacker to read the contactless payment cards. Another channel that
an adversary can follow to obtain the card number details is from the merchants sales receipt
from reader Point of Sale (POS) terminal.
3.5.2. Merchant Receipts and Guessable Card Numbers
To maintain sales records made using payment cards, in-store merchants maintain mer-
chant copy of customers transaction. We found that merchant copies from a number of
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Figure 4: Merchant receipts exploiting full payment card number and expiry date in plane text.
high street retailers revealed their customer’s complete payment card number and expiry
date (shown in Figure 4). These card details are enough to create and purchase goods from
giant online merchants stores like Amazon [24]. Worst of all, none of the merchants were
educated about the risks of losing merchant copies, and few of the merchants even agreed to
sell several merchant copies for under a dollar. This means, whenever a customer uses their
card with in-store retailers, there is a risk of card number being stolen. Just from around
our organization, we found 23 such retailers whose merchant copy revealed full card number
and expiry date.
We further investigated the possibility of an attacker generating payment card numbers
and explored that an adversary can easy produce and validate a database of active payment
card numbers as discussed below:
The payment card numbering specifications are governed by the ISO/IEC 7812-1:2017
[42] and the ISO 10202-6:1994 [43]. Table 2 enumerates the useful insights that can be
obtained from a credit card number. It can be learned from a card number that customer
account number fills nine spaces and therefore, the maximum number of possible active
card numbers for a bank would be one less to 109 (a billion). An attacker starts after
selecting target banks BIN (bank with a high number of customers would give high positives),
randomly generates thousands of accounts number using Luhn’s check algorithm [44] (or
with automated bots as demonstrated in [41]) and makes transactions using the generated
card numbers on online payment websites. When a transaction is made, a transaction
authorization request is sent by the merchant to the card issuing bank. The card issuing
bank, through authorization response message (further discussed in next section), indicates
to the merchant that the card number used while trying to make a purchase is not correct.
For an attacker, the Authorization response will reveal the validity of a card number.
For example when we made a transaction with invalid card number on a merchant
website-x (website name masked), we received the response as shown in Figure 5. If the card
number was valid, the authorization only changes to indicate any other invalid card data
element (as shown in Figure 6). A recent investigation into Tesco bank breach revealed that
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Figure 5: Response code revealing the validity of a card number
Figure 6: Response code revealing the validity of a card number and expiry date
attackers used similar technique to exploit payment card details of around 9000 customers
[45]. Additionally we observed a weak security practice by a leading card issuer (name
masked) while issuing the payment card numbers to their customers. We found that the
card issuer issued payment card numbers in a serial guessable sequence. Shown in Figure
7, are three payment cards belonging to the same customer and card numbers are shown
issued in a sequence with a difference of 8.
3.5.3. Architecture of Authorization Response Codes
As discussed, after a merchant submits an authorization request (AuthzReq), the card
holder bank responds back the merchant or it’s payment processor with what is known as
an authorization response (AuthzRes). The AuthzRes is a string of complex codes which
indicates to the merchant the transaction status and any card data field put incorrect by the
card holder. To make AuthzRes codes readable for the customers at checkout, these response
codes are parsed by the merchants into the user understandable language. Perceiving the
parsed AuthzRes from a rogue merchant‘s mindset; the codes conversely could be used to
learn all card data fields.
Table 3 shows an AuthzRes code for the merchant with PayPal as its payment processor.
It can be derived from Table 3 that the transaction was declined because CVV2 supplied at
checkout by the customer does not match with the actual card holder file with the bank’s
Figure 7: Payment cards belonging to the same customer and card numbers are shown issued in a sequence
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Table 3: Authorization response code for merchant with PayPal as payment processor
RESULT =114& PNREF =VXYZ01234567& RESPMSG =114 & AVSADDR=N & AVSZIP =N& IAVS =N& CVV2MATCH =N
RESULT > 0 Result > 0 indicates the transaction was declined. RESPMSG gives a
brief reason for the decline of the transaction
PNREF Value A unique value that identifies a transaction
RESPMSG 114 The transaction was declined (Card security code doesn’t match).
RESPMSG 114 implies that the transaction was declined because of the
invalid CVV2
AVSADDR N Address of the card holder was not verified for the transaction
AVSZIP N Postcode provided at the checkout matches with card holder’s bank file
IAV N Cardholder country code is local
CVV2MATCH N Card security code mismatch
authorization server. This AuthRes code also implies that the card number and the expiry
date were valid.In the next step, the AuthRes code is simplified at the checkout in user
natural language. For example, during our experimentswith valid card numbers when the
expiry was not entered correctly while making a purchase on website x (name masked),
the parsed response string as shown in Figure 6 explicitly stated “Your payment has been
declined as your card expiry date was not valid”. Educating a user/attacker about the
incorrect card data element. Having known that the VISA authorization network does not
detect multiple invalid attempts when distributed across multiple payment gateways [41],
attacker has countless attempts to guess expiry date and all the other card data required to
make an online payment [41]. Using the AuthRes codes an attacker could easily be able to
obtain card data fields for all Visa cards[41].
4. Mobile Payment Frauds
Over the years, mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have started to replace
desktop computers. Fraudsters have caught the wave of opportunity and they have been
shifting their activities to this channel [46]. Mobile web fraud strategies are quite similar to
those used on traditional online fraud, making the adaptation of cyber frauds to the mobile
situation often straightforward. Furthermore, fraudsters have found new chances to make
profit specific to mobile applications.
Some of the characteristics that have helped to increase the popularity of mobile devices
such as ease of use and mobility, create new security risks not associated with computers.
It is common that mobile devices are shared with friends and family, and it is potentially
easier to leave them unattended in public spaces where they can be used for a second person
or easily stolen.
Mobile payments have been adopted in different ways. We are using mobile devices for
online shopping and to pay for digital services. Moreover, they have become popular for
contactless payments instead of paying with debit or credit cards. The main models for
mobile payments usually relayed in one of the following technologies [47]:
• Stored value account systems: Usually the method is integrated into an app on the
mobile device i.e. payment wallet. Apple Pay, Samsung Pay, Android Pay, Microsoft
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Wallet and PayPal are the most widely used wallets, being Paypal the only one which
works across different operating systems. They allow the customer to make faster
online payments (when the merchant accept them) and contactless transactions using
the Near Field Communication technology included in many mobile devices. Other
popular wallet apps are brand specific, such as Boost Mobile and the Starbucks Wallet
app which usually include loyalty programs.
• Account based systems: A mobile web payment system can store card details which
can be remembered for future purchases turning the payment into a simple click-to-
buy. Commonly, an strong authentication is required to commit large value payments.
Banks have taken advantage of this technology and they have developed applications
which allow costumers to operate in their accounts in real-time i.e. direct transfers.
• Mobile billing systems: The consumer uses a premium SMS or direct carrier billing
during the checkout. The success of earlier mobile content services such as logos
and ringtones accustomed consumers to use this type of payment. An advantage of
this type of payment is that existing telecom operator billing systems are suitable for
handling micropayments transactions.
A common way to steal payment information is through malware which has been in-
stalled previously in the device. Others ways are social engineering and fake apps [48, 49].
Because of the low prices of mobile devices, fraudsters can afford using many different de-
vices to commit the attack and most of the observed fraudulent e-commerce transactions are
originated from new devices[50]. Using new devices, fraudsters can avoid some of the tradi-
tional anti-fraud measures such as those based on a persistent identification which i.e. the
merchant can identify that is the same device trying to get access from a different account.
4.1. Economics of Mobile Payment Fraud
During the first quarter of 2018 more than half of the financial transactions took place on
mobile devices [50] and it has been on this channel where the highest percentage of fraudulent
operations have taken place. However, the awareness of risks on mobile payments is low and
many merchants believe that mobile devices are more secure than computers [51].
On the other hand, the number of merchants offering their services through apps instead
through dedicated mobile websites has grown considerably, especially for merchants with
high revenue [52]. At the end of the first quarter of 2018, there were available 7.1 million
mobile applications at the leading app stores of the market [53](Fig. 8 shows the number
of applications available by most popular app stores in this period). At the same time, the
proportion of cyber fraud carried out using mobile apps has increased from 5% to 39% in
the last three years [54].
4.2. Attack Methods in Mobile Payments
Many types of fraud affect the end-user of mobile devices. We describe the group with
higher incidence.
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Figure 8: Number of apps available in leading app stores in first quarter of 2018.
4.2.1. Account Takeover
Account takeover is the most frequent type of fraud [55]. After fraudsters have found
out about the access information of a user, they utilize it to sign up for an expensive service
or purchase a product. Bad actors manage to access personally identifiable information
in many different ways such as data breaches which become more and more frequent i.e.
between May and July of 2017, Equifax, one of the largest credit bureaus in the U.S, was a
victim of a data breach. In this case, personal information of almost 150 million of customers
was exposed, including in a few cases credit card data [56].
Once an account has been taken over, it is difficult to fight because both legitimate and
fraudulent users use the correct login credentials. Customers are particularly vulnerable
when they do not use strong passwords and they re-use them for several accounts [57]. Es-
pecially when the provider utilizes a one-factor authentication method increases the exposure
of the users. For example, after the coffee chain Starbucks launched an app which allowed
customers to pay for their coffee, several customers reported that money was withdrawn
from their accounts without authorization [58]. After fraudsters managed to login the app,
they top up the account using the stored credit card and then they purchased gift cards
which can be sold in the black market. The company said that criminals were obtaining
login credentials from hacked websites and trying them out in the Starbucks app.
4.2.2. Phishing
Phishing is a well-known cyber attack where fraudsters steal personal information from
users under false pretences by email, phone call or social media sites. It is one of the oldest
types of cyber fraud attacks but still it is frequently used in mobile channels i.e. mobile users
are 18 times more likely to be exposed to a phishing attempt than to malware [59], and three
times more vulnerable to a phising attack than in computers [60]. While many users have
learned to be suspicious of links and attachments in emails, however, today 66% of emails
are checked on the mobile devices [61]. Similarly, the popularity of mobile applications like
SMS and WhatsApp also attracted the fraudsters to utilize the medium for getting personal
information of the victim via the phishing attack.
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4.2.3. Fake Applications
Scammers develop fake apps which may include malware or be designed to steal personal
info. Sometimes phantom applications use and organization brand without permission to
easily trick the users. Financial Trojan horse malware is one of the most popular cases
because of the increasing availability of malware-as-a-service kits available in the cyber un-
derground [50]. In some cases, the fake application sends premium SMS messages where
an amount of money charged to the phone bill of the user goes directly to the fraudsters.
Several researchers demonstrated the use of fake Near Field Communication (NFC) reader
application on android enabled platforms. NFC enabled mobile phones use ISO 14443 Iden-
tification cards – Contactless integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards (part 1-4) commu-
nication standards and these are the same standards as used by contactless payment cards
and readers to facilitate payments.
Mehrnezad et al. in [62] demonstrated the practicality of fake NFC applications initiating
fraudulent transaction with contactless payment cards. In that, the researchers were able
to design a fake NFC application which can interact with the contactless cards kept in a
mobile phone wallet, make fraudulent transactions, read user locations and upload these to
an attacker controlled server. In fact, in a single Google play search we found 38 such NFC
android mobile applications capable of reading contactless payment cards.
4.2.4. Fraudulent Website
A large number of fake website will use a domain name that impersonate or refer a well-
known brand. But this would not represent the official website. For example, you apply for
the job on-line, and they ask to deposit funds to process your application. This type of fraud
shows the same characteristics of the computer case. However, in mobile devices, it is more
successful because users are less likely to notice that a website is slightly different than the
original [63]. This is because, screens size of mobile devices are relatively small, constraining
the user interface. This makes it considerably more difficult for users to recognize which
mobile application or website they are interacting with [64].
4.3. Systems for Detecting Frauds In Mobile Payment Systems
The trade-off usability-security is the main concern when implementing anti-fraud mea-
sures. Users do not want that their online experience is affected by security steps. At the
same time, merchants know that if there are not able to provide a smooth setting, they will
have to deal with the user disappointment and economic losses.
On the other hand, because the specific hardware specifications of mobile devices, the
adopted measures must meet certain intrinsic aspects of the platform:
• lightweight: computational demand of the system have to be low since mobile compu-
tational power is limited.
• restrict the communications: some mobile devices users i.e. smartphone users, can be
charged by data rates. Additionally, the bandwidth or data usage may be limited.
Therefore, the amount of information sent and received for the security approach
should be low.
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• restrict the energy consumption: battery life is nowadays a big concern in mobile
technology. It is required that energy consumption level is as much efficient as possible.
4.3.1. Control access: authentication mechanisms
Because of the friendly portability of mobile devices, access control measures are neces-
sary. An authentication mechanism is a common measure to prevent unauthorized access
to the device. In an authentication process, the identity of the user is verified according to
information provide either directly or indirectly by the user. We can classify authentication
methods on:
• Knowledge-based methods: the process is based in information which the user knows
i.e. a password or a Personal Identification Number (PIN).
• Object-based methods: the process is based in something the user possesses i.e. ex-
ample a hardware token.
• Biometric-based methods: the process is based on information obtained usually from
sensors. This information describes the physical or behavioural characteristics of the
users such as the tone, cadence and pitch of their voice.
In [65] was introduced an object-based approach using a Bluetooth token. In this ap-
proach, when the user pretends to gain access to the device, a smartphone try to communi-
cate with a token through Bluetooth connection. If the token can be reached and the smart-
phone receives confirmation of the communication, it will be unlocked. However, object-
based authentication methods have been rarely implemented for mobile devices. Nowadays,
people bring their devices most of the time with them, and the obligation to carry on an
authentication device makes these systems less practical.
Knowledge-based methods have been used for a long time on mobile authentication pro-
cesses and they are still used widely. PIN and password have been for years the most common
authentication approach on this channel, despite that their inconvenience and weakness have
been proved many times. This method is susceptible to simple attacks i.e. shoulder surfing
where fraudsters spy the actions of victims and smudge attacks where smudge stains on the
display are used to infer the password [66]. On the other hand, because of user have to re-
member the code, either they often use the same memorable instance for different accounts
or they choose a weak one. A study has shown that over 6.000.000 passwords, 91% of all
of them belong to a list of just 1.000. The same study point that in this list 8.5% of the
individuals use either password or 123456 as a password [67]. Furthermore, passwords have
reported stolen from big databases on many occasions.
Some approaches have try to overcome some of the limitations of PIN’s and passwords. In
[68], they introduce a graphical authentication system which pretends to confuse an observer
requiring different information each time the user tries to login. In order to make the system
more manageable, the users have to remember a group of images instead of codes and they
will have to select the images they known between those revealed. The study showed an
increment of the time to login and lower success rate. [66] attempted to reduce the threat
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of the shoulder surfing attack. In this case, the user should draw a shape in the back of
the device, area which should be more difficult to watch. The system was developed in a
prototype because the additional hardware required is not available in any smartphone in
the market.
However, PIN/Passwords are intrusive techniques which require a specific action of the
user and they take place only once at the beginning of the session.
Biometrics based methods have been introduced more recently and they are receiving
a lot of attention from the community. Biometric data describe physical or behavioural
characteristics from a human being. Different sources will include different attributes such
as features which describe a voice pattern and motion patterns.
A Biometric Authentication System (BAS) evaluates biometric data for verification or
identification of individuals. Nowadays, many different sensors have been incorporated in
the smartphone such as environmental, location and motion sensors. Obtaining biometric
data from them is easy and straightforward and BAS have been found trustworthy.
With the integration of low-cost and high-quality cameras on mobile devices, face recog-
nition authentication methods, which had been used widely in banking and security access
systems, become popular for unlocking the mobile devices [69] [70]. In a face recognition
approach, the system stores patterns of feature images or video frames which characterized
the user i.e. relative position, size, and shape of the eyes. One of the main threats of this
method is the face spoof attack. In the simplest face spoofing attacks such as print attacks
and replay attacks, the scammer basically tries to mislead the system showing to the camera
an image of the victim. Nowadays, with the popularity of social networks, it is very easy to
have access to photos and videos from most of the people. More sophisticated attacks i.e.
the 3D Masks attack, use a 3d-scanners. Measures to improve theses methods have been
proposed for both but results are still limited [71]. An additional concern in this approaches
is that the process of face capturing is influenced by a lot of external conditions such as the
illumination in the scenario and the clothes worn by the individual.
As same as face recognition, iris recognition uses the devices camera to capture biometric
features. Most of the non-mobile iris authentication systems used images taken in near-
infrared illumination because iris is usually imaged close to the infrared spectrum [72].
Quality of the camera on mobile devices has been improved drastically lately, but they do
not account with this kind of technology. Thus, when a picture of the iris is taken in real
scenarios, distortion is introduced because effects such as low light, shadow and off-angle
gaze direction, decreasing the accuracy of the method [73].
Periocular authentication systems share a lot of similarities with iris and face recognition
schemes. Periocular biometric features are extracted from an image of the facial region in
the vicinity of the eye. The main advantage compared to the iris recognition method is
the easier way to capture the data. Furthermore, invisible lighting it is not required to
capture the image. Extensive research of this method for authentication has been done on
smartphone platforms [74].
More recently, some manufacturers have included a fingerprint reader in their devices to
authenticate users [75]. This method has a lot of similarities to face recognition. The main
difference is that the features used to discriminate between users are those obtained from
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print patterns of the individual. Many users trust this authentication method [76]. However,
this method usually is not very accurate [77]. Conventional touch sensors introduce physi-
cal distortion because of the pressure applied by the individual which critically affects the
authentication process. Furthermore, the classification is influenced for others environmen-
tal factors such as humidity. Furthermore, fingerprint images databases represent a huge
risk. There have been multiple cases where information from password databases have been
stolen. Whether information from a fingerprint database was stolen, authentication patterns
could not be reset.
Voice recognition authentication methods are based on the idea that the voice of each in-
dividual has unique characteristics that can help to discriminate between users. Banks have
been very interested in this technology because they could be integrated it in telebanking
applications. However, a study which compares the usability of several biometric authen-
tication methods found voice recognition less user-friendly than password entry and face
recognition [78]. In the mentioned study, most of the participants involved gave negative
feedback about the method.
Another biometric authentication approach which has been extendedly studied on mobile
devices is touchscreen recognition. This method is based on the idea that the manner that
the user touch the screen can be used to authenticate individuals. Usually, this method
is applied in continuous approaches i.e. the user is authenticated continuously during the
whole session with a certain frequency which depends on the capabilities of the system. The
obvious limitation of this approach for continuous authentication is that not all the activities
involve touch actions.
Continuous authentication approaches are non-intrusive. With the inclusion of motion
sensors such as the accelerometer, the magnetometer and the gyroscope, motion authenti-
cation for mobile devices has become more popular. Usually, motion recognition is used on
continuous authentication approaches too. Some studies have been focused on identifying
users based in the way they walk [79] and in the way the hold the device [80, 81].
4.3.2. Machine Learning to fight Payment Frauds
The industry is continually seeking measures to combat fraud activity. However, where
a new protective procedure is introduced fraudsters adapt to it.
Because of the low prices of mobile devices, fraudsters can afford using many different
devices to commit the attack and most of the observed fraudulent e-commerce transactions
are originated from devices that are ’new’ [50]. Operating in this manner, fraudsters can
avoid some of the traditional anti-fraud measures such as those based on the persistent
identification.
As we have mentioned, one step authentication processes are easier to hijack especially
because users many times utilize the same access info for different services. Combining
several types of measures the device is less likely to be compromised.
In this scene, Machine Learning (ML) techniques become to play an important role.The
use of ML in identifying and mitigating fraud has grown 13% since 2015 [52]. Approaches
which involve the use of ML algorithms analyzed behavioural data related to the users,
helping to detect anomaly patterns which can be correlated with fraud. ML algorithms have
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been proved very efficient, but their use on mobile devices are limited to the computational
resources available. For this reason, some authors propose a distributed approach in which
some of the computational burdens are consigned to the cloud [82].
Many continuous authentication biometric approaches are based in ML approaches such
as Support Vector Machine and Hidden Markov Model [83, 79]. More recently, some ap-
proaches have been based in Deep Neural Networks [80, 81, 84, 85, 86].
5. Telecommunication Frauds
The telephone system has become an integral part of daily routine. There is more than
6 billion telephony user across the world [87, 88]. The huge customer base, easy integration
with the Internet and cheap call rate have made telephone network a lucrative medium for
the fraudsters to target the victims in real-time. In this section, first, we provide economics
of telecommunication frauds, then provide the methods which fraudsters are using to target
the victim and then present brief discussions on methods designed to protect the network
and consumers.
5.1. Economics of Telecommunication Frauds
Telecommunication systems (Mobile, Fixed, Internet Telephony) have become an inte-
gral of humans life by staying in touch with friends and family and doing business com-
munications. As of 2017, the number of telecommunication users in the United Kingdom
is approximately 125.5 million (Fixed and Mobile). The rapid increases of the user base
and cheap telephony rates over the Internet Telephony (VoIP (Voice over IP)) have also
facilitated scammers and fraudsters to use this medium for the financial benefits. Scammers
over the Internet telephony can use spoofed identities of the legitimate entities (for example
banks, tax department) or use non-trackable anonymous identities for making unsolicited
calls and messages to the telephony users. These calls and messages not only annoy call
receiver with the unwanted ringing but would also result in a financial loss.
There are around $2.25 trillion accumulated losses in the telecommunication industry
across the globe as reported by the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA)
[10]. It is estimated that unsolicited or spam calls over telephony results in a loss of $38.1
billion per year to the fraudsters and scammers. This is 1.69% of the total telecommunication
revenue. Moreover, FTC (Federal Trade Communication) has estimated that people in
the USA lose $8.6 billion annually to the fraudsters, and the majority of fraudsters use
telephony medium for the purpose. The following are the top categories of frauds in the
telecommunication networks: $0.8 billion to SMS Faking or Spoofing, $1.6 billion to Phishing
and Pharming, $1.8 billion to Wangiri (Call Back attack) [10].
5.2. Attack Methods in Telecommunication Frauds
The following are the top categories of frauds in the telecommunication networks: $0.8
billion to SMS Faking or Spoofing, $1.6 billion to Phishing and Pharming, $1.8 billion to
Wangiri (Call Back attacks) [10]. This section list some of the most common fraud types
and their attack mechanism.
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5.2.1. Wangiri Fraud
Wangiri (literally, ring and disconnect) is a type of fraud call that was first originated
in Japan back in 2002 [89]. In the wangiri call attack, the attacker convinces call recipients
to call a premium rate national or international phone. The attacker made a short miscall
on the victim identity and curious recipients assume that they have missed a call from the
legitimate caller and call back the callee. They are then charged at the premium call rate
for this call. The user does not realize they are a victim of this fraud until he receives
the monthly bill from his service provider. In this attack, the attacker convinces callee to
callback on the premium number which is under the control of fraudsters.
5.2.2. Simbox or ByPass Fraud
Bypass Fraud or SIM Box fraud is the most costly type of fraud affecting the regulator
as well as the telecommunication service provider. The Bypass fraud is common in regions
or countries where call rates for international termination are substantially higher than the
local landline or mobile call charges. The fraud results in an average annual loss of $ 4.3
billion [90]. In Bypass fraud, fraudsters illegally install or place a SIM Box at its premises.
The sim box routes the calls from the international caller to the callee, presenting that call
is originated from the local mobile or telephone fixed exchanges, thus bypassing charges
paid to the regulator on the international long distance call. This call fraud largely affects
the regulator and the end-users in the sense that regulator loses money because of local
termination and end-users is paying for the premium call route but route provided to him
is a low-quality route.
In practice, Bypass fraud works in two ways [91, 92]. 1) The fraudster presents himself
as the legitimate telecommunication entity to other telecommunication companies. Once
the agreement is signed for the interconnect, the terminating operator routes call s from the
originating operator via the simbox, which is not observable to the caller and the originating
operator. However, over the period of time, the caller could notice the low-quality route
because of degraded quality and report it to the operator. 2) The owner of the Simbox
network to offer the cheap call termination, though this would not directly impact the caller
or the callee in terms of financial loss, it would bring a loss for the regulator and legitimate
call termination operators for not receiving share on the calls originating from overseas.
5.2.3. International Revenue Sharing Fraud
In International Revenue Sharing Fraud (IRSF), fraudsters illegally hack or convince
callee to make a call to a premium number. This would not only result in financial loss for
telecommunication operators but would also bring loss to end-users and small enterprises.
IRSF fraud can be committed in two ways. 1) the fraudster can trick the callee to call
back on the premium numbers by using a stolen identity or making a miscall to the callee
[93, 89]. 2) The fraudster uses the resources of hacked telecommunication operator or private
branch exchange (PBX) of an enterprise in order to originate calls for the premium number
obtained from an International Premium Rate Number provider. With IRSF, Fraudsters
make repeated calls to premium numbers or international calls to destinations with high
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termination rates. This results in a loss of around $6.1 billion a year to the enterprise and
telecommunication operators [90].
5.2.4. Subscription Frauds
In subscription fraud, the fraudster uses the telecommunication services with the inten-
tion of not paying the charges to the telecommunication operators. This is probably the
common fraud activity and can be easily managed without a huge investment. The fraud-
sters in a subscription fraud can be grouped into two types: 1) the personal use, i.e buying
the subscription services or buy the post-paid sim cards on the stolen identities and have
no intentions to pay the bills, 2) for the profit, i.e. selling the long distance calls using
acquired sim cards. The subscription fraud is the major problems for telecommunication
service providers its accounts for $2 billion which is roughly 40% of all fraud losses [90].
5.2.5. Robo and Telemarketing Calls
A robocall or the telemarketing call is the phone call that uses telecommunication
medium and the computerized autodialer to deliver a pre-recorded telemarketing message
to the call receiver. These calls are often made for the political campaigns, collecting dona-
tions, offering holiday packages, promoting political and religious thoughts and selling legal
and illegal products. These calls can come at any hour of the day and require an immediate
response from the recipient, thus annoy call recipients while at work, disturb them in their
family times, and can even interrupt their sleep in late hours at night. Recent statistics
on telephony spam have revealed that answering a spam call would result in an estimated
loss of 20 million man-hours for a small business enterprise in the United States with the
estimated loss of about $475 million annually [94]. In 2016, estimated US residents have
received around 2.4 billion robocalls per month [95]. Every year service providers, regu-
lators, and law enforcement agencies receive thousands of complaints from consumers for
unsolicited, unauthorized, and fraudulent callers trying to abuse them. These calls can also
be the first step towards the frauds. FTC (Federal Trade Communication) has estimated
that every year scammers and spammers cause a loss of $8.6 billion annually to a citizen
of USA due to frauds and majority of them are initiated from the telephone [96]. In 2016,
it was estimated that around 27 million U.S. consumers lost approximately $7.4 billion to
phone scams and robocalling, averaging $274 per victim [97].
5.2.6. Over the Top Bypass
Over the top (OTT) communication applications are the application that operators over
the Internet. These communication applications provide services like instant messaging,
telephony over Internet and streaming video. The OTT apps are widely being used by the
people for staying connected with the loved ones and making long distance cheap or free
telephone calls. WhatsApp, the most popular OTT app for the instant messaging and voice
has more than 1.5 billion monthly active users [98]. The OTT bypass is similar to the
simbox fraud but this fraud is generally done by the telecommunication operators with their
customers and termination operators [99]. In this fraud, the telecommunication operator
makes an agreement with OTT provider and divert calls for the receiver through the OTT
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app instead of diverting it to legitimate telecommunication operators. The operator commits
frauds with his customer by charging a premium rate and commit fraud with the termination
operators by not paying the legitimate share.
5.3. Systems for Detecting Frauds and Spamming in Telecommunications
In this section we present a discussion on detection system from two perspectives: 1)
systems designed for detecting frauds and 2) systems designed for detecting spam or robo-
calling.
5.3.1. Fraud Detection Systems
Frauds in telecommunication networks can be identified in two ways: 1) analyzing the
call detailed records of the subscribers, 2) analyzing the quality of service features of speech
and signaling messages between the caller and the callee. In this section, we discuss some
prevalent systems used for identifying frauds in the mobile cellular and telecommunication
networks.
The quality of voice call degraded during its conversion from the IP to mobile call. The
features of voice quality, delay and signaling delay between caller and callee is used to identify
the simbox or over the top frauds in the mobile cellular networks [100, 99]. It is easy to
spoof the caller identity using VoIP systems and the modern smartphone applications. The
identities of the user can be authenticated using the cryptographic handshake between the
caller and the callee [101, 102, 103], using the public key infrastructure [103] and replaying
the call to the caller during the call setup phase [104]. However, having a public key
infrastructure in a voice network is problematic because of small bandwidth voice channel.
The characteristics of speech content [105] can also be used to identify the spoofers and
fraudsters but it requires extensive system resources and speech database of legitimate and
non-legitimate users.
The collected call detailed records and machine learning approaches could be used to-
gether to identify the different calling patterns of residential and commercial subscribers
[106, 107, 108]. The accuracy and detection performance of these systems mainly depends
on the underlying machine learning system and a number of features used for characteriz-
ing the behavior. These systems could identify the fraudsters making calls at a very high
rate but could not identify stealthy callers and callers frequently changing their networks.
The collaboration among multiple service providers could identify the fraudsters in a timely
manner. The collaboration between service can be carried out through the exchange of their
dataset in a multi-party secure set intersection way [109].
5.3.2. Robo or Telemarketing Call Detection Systems
The service provider deploys a standalone system that analyzes the behavior of the caller
within the network. This section outlines some of the standalone systems that have been
designed for blocking robo and telemarketers in the service provider network [110, 111, 112].
Readers are encouraged to see [111, 112] for the complete details how spam detection system
works and their limitations. In this section, we briefly discuss the working of some prominent
detection systems.
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In telecommunication networks, the successful call consists of two parts: a signaling
part– responsible for establishing the link between the caller and the callee, and the speech
exchange part – responsible for exchanging bidirectional speech content between the caller
and the caller. In a telecommunication network, the content-based detection system can
be applied in two ways: processing speech content in real-time or process speech content
after the call. A number of content-based systems have proposed for detecting spammers
in the telecommunication networks [113] [114], [115]. These systems mainly measure the
similarity between speech samples in real and non-realtime. However, the content-based
systems have some limitations: 1) content is available after the call this is late to flag the
block the caller as it has already disturbed the callee, 2) requires extensive system resources,
3) it is prohibited by law to monitor and process users speech content.
A C/R (Challenge/Response) system is a enables telephony users to solve the given
challenge. Humans (legitimate and non-legitimate) can easily solve the challenge initiated
by the call handling system, whereas machines would not be able to solve the challenge. The
C/R-based system operates in two modes:1) by having authentication in a non-intrusive way
without involving subscriber [116] and 2) an intrusive way using a CAPTCHA challenge to
verify the subscriber [117], [118, 119]. C/R-based approaches are well suited for blocking
machine or auto-dialer spammers but its placement in a real-network has problems. Further,
it will introduce notable call setup delay which might displease subscriber for each call made.
The list-based systems are identity-based systems that place the subscriber in the white,
black or grey list depending on the behavior of the subscriber [120], [121, 122]. The call
processing unit checks the nature of the subscriber during the call setup phase. A list
database can be either global – applied to all subscribers or the personalized – applied to
the particular subscribers. The list-based approaches need to be implemented along with
other approaches that actually make a decision which list the subscriber should be placed
in [123], [124], [125]. The limitation of the list-based system is that it needs a continuous
update of database and coordination with an underlying detection system for list database.
The spam caller can also be made barred from calling by imposing a huge financial
penalty for his unwanted call. A major limitation of the cost-based system is that it requires
a comprehensive micro-payment system for the computation of deduction and holding of
money.
Another way to stop unwanted telemarketing calls is to have a Multi-Stage system that
establishes an internal collaboration between different standalone approaches [126, 124, 127].
This would improve the detection accuracy and detection time because it uses collective
information about caller’s behavior from multiple approaches but it could have high call
setup delay. Furthermore, the CAPTCHA based multistage systems require interaction
with the caller and the callee, thus are intrusive.
The statistics-based detection systems monitor different call statistics of the subscriber
during and after the call. These approaches first collect statistics from the raw call detailed
records or signaling messages and then apply data mining to characterize the behavior of
the caller [128, 129, 130].
Scammers normally use some specialized software and hardware devices which are quite
different from devices used by the legitimate users. The device fingerprinting could be
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used to block the spammers by having the database of fingerprints of legitimate and non-
legitimate devices at the call processing system [131]. The use of device fingerprinting in
real deployment is not practical and scalable as it requires management of fingerprints a
large number of commercial and non-commercial VoIP devices. Additionally, a spammer
can bypass fingerprinting-based systems by adopting fingerprints and protocol stack similar
to the devices used by the legitimate subscribers.
Scammers use a telephone directory to randomly select their victims. Furthermore, call
records contains sensitive information and is not legal to use them without user consent.
Telephony Honeynet (a network of a virtual number not assigned to any human) could be
used to collect the data to be used for characterizing the behaviour of the caller in the
network, [132], [133]. The honeynet-based solution can identify spammers but these would
not be able to identify those spammers spamming other users in the network. The spammers
can also bypass honeypot systems by learning the numbering pattern of honey phones or by
using phone numbers of confirmed human beings.
The reputation of legitimate callers increases over time and reputation of scammers de-
crease over the time because they do not develop strong social circle with their callees.
The reputation of the caller can be computed in two ways: 1) having direct collaboration
between subscribers, and 2) deploying a centralized system for handling and processing of
subscriber feedback. The trust between subscribers can be computed in two ways: 1) in-
trusive way – that implicitly requires interaction with the call recipient of the subscriber
[123],[124],[134, 135] for the feedback about subscriber, and 2) a non-intrusive way – that ex-
plicitly utilize information from call logs recorded for the billing purposes [136]. Reputation-
based anti-SPIT systems have shown great effectiveness against spammers in email and VoIP
network but their effectiveness depends on the set of features used for the computation of
global reputation. In some cases, a spammer could have reputation scores by creating a
Sybil network between his acquired identities and also spoofed identities of the legitimate
subscribers.
The simple way to limit spammers to use the network is to define some strong legislation
and imposing heavy penalty on the users involved in mass telemarketing and spamming.
These legislations prohibit unsolicited communication to reach the recipient unless prior
consent of the recipient is obtained. The major limitation of the legislation-based system
is the difficulty of tracing back the initiators of spam. Moreover, if the regulator or law
enforcement agencies trace-back the initiator of unsolicited communication even then there is
no such global law exists that will apply to spammers across the world. Moreover, spammers
make spam from anywhere around the world thus make the anti-spam law of one country
inapplicable to the spammer spamming from places where no such law exists.
The calling behavior of the subscriber becomes more meaningful when subscribers are
observed across many service providers. Naturally, collaboration among service providers
would improve the detection time and detection accuracy because of the collective use of
information from many autonomous collaborating service providers. A very few works have
been reported that incorporate collaboration among service providers for rating the sub-
scribers [137] [138][139] [140, 141].These systems could improve the detection accuracy but
brings the challenges of privacy preservation and collaboration overheads.
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6. Way forward To Minimize Frauds
Cybercriminals and scammers continuously changing their attack strategies and use the
loopholes in the technology to have a high success rate. In this section, we highlight some
challenges that need to be addressed to minimize the cyber frauds.
6.1. Identity spoofing
Cybercriminals normally have a large number of identities as well as have the ability to
spoof the identity of the legitimate entity, for example, banks, social security and tax de-
partments. Though, there are solutions available to verify the identity of the sender over the
email, web and mobile application by verifying the identity using public key infrastructure.
However, people are unaware of its working and the verification process. Furthermore, as
stated, nowadays the telephony channel become the most preferred way to defraud users.
Moreover, the telephony channel has also been used for two-factor authentication and ex-
change of sensitive information for example codes and card number from the banking entity
to the user. Though the telephony system is secure to some extent, but it does not provide
any mechanism for identity verification to enable users to verify who is on the other side of
the call. The challenge in the design of verification and authentication for telephony is two-
fold: 1) achieve authentication without using the public key infrastructure, 2) enabling user
to authenticate without any additional call setup delay. The challenge in the former case is
that how the public key infrastructure is establishing and who should act as the certifying
authority. The challenges in the latter case are the usage of the system that does not require
public key infrastructure keeping in mind the limited bandwidth telephony channel.
6.2. Spear Phishing
Cybercriminals are intelligent enough by pretending themselves as the trusted entity.
Spear phishing is an email-spoofing attack that targets users, to get the unauthorized access
to sensitive information. In the case of spear phishing, however, the source of the email
is likely to be known to the target that makes him trust the information in the email. To
overcome this attack, there is a strong need to train the users about verifying the email
headers. This becomes more challenging for the people who do not know about the working
of the technology. The users should also be informed about the risk of sharing the information
over the social media sites which can be used for sophisticated spear phishing attack.
6.3. Collaboration
Collaboration among service providers and users would considerably improve the defense
against the cybercriminals. However, there is no such mechanism exists that enables finan-
cial institutions, government organizations and end-users to effective collaboration with each
other to identify the intelligent cybercriminals. Furthermore, the organization is also reluc-
tant to collaborate because of privacy concerns and they are a competitor to each other.
The challenge in the design of the collaborative system is that it should provide a setup
that ensures the privacy and integrity of data provided by the collaborators. One way to
achieve privacy-preserving collaboration is to have a cryptographic system along with the
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use of blockchain. This collaboration would ensure privacy and security of collaborator
which convince them to the part in the collaboration
6.4. Cyber Education and Training
The cybercriminals often use social engineering attacks and emotional sentiments to
defraud their targets. The old age people are more vulnerable to be attacked and are
victims of such an attack. It is important that financial entities and organization should
have a mechanism to provide some training (in the form of video or poster) to their customers
time and again, for example at the time of when customer registered with them and when
customer reached to a specific age group. Further, it is also recommended that financial
institutions should have two-factor authentication for transfer of money from the old age
customers.
7. Conclusions
Crimes over Internet technologies are sky rocketed. Every year, service providers, regu-
lators, and end-users lose billions of dollars to cybercriminals as the result of targeted and
organized crime. In this paper, we highlighted a popular mechanism used by the cyber-
criminals to defraud the users and enterprises. Specifically, we highlighted ways used by
the cybercriminals and the economics of each attacked mechanism. We have also discussed
systems used for detecting and blocking cybercriminals in three diverse domains: that are
the card payment fraud, mobile payment frauds, and telephony frauds. Finally, we provided
a way forward to improve the security of the systems.
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Table A.4: List of identified underground carding forums
Forum Name Forum Address Forum Name Forum Address
Agorafoum Lacbzxobeprssfx.onion Bus1nexx Bus1nezz.biz
Altenen Altenen.com Cardingmafia Cardingmafia.ws
Crdpro Crdpro.su Bpcsqad Bpcsquad.com
Crimenetwork Crimenc5wxi63f4r.onion Procarder Procarder.ru
Cardingforum Cardingforum.org Cardersforum Cardersforum.se
Hackingforum Hacingforum.ru Crimes Crimes.ws
Unixoder Unixorder.com Carderbase Carderbase.su
Crdclub Crdclub.ws Carder Carder.me
Carderscave Carderscave.ru Darkstuff Darkstuff.net
Infraud Infraud.cc Coinodeal Coinodeal.com
Lampeduza Lampeduza.so Texedocrew Tuxedocrew.biz
Blackstuff Blackstuff.net/forum.php Privatemarket Privatemarket.us
Omerta Omerta.cm Diamonddumps Diamonddumps.org
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